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Myth and Metaphysics 
 
Kevin Schilbrack 
 
 
 
 
 
The very idea of metaphysics in myth 
 
This paper defends the assertion that among the things that religions teach, 
inculcate, and celebrate are understandings of the world that are metaphysical 
in scope, and that these metaphysical views are often taught, inculcated, and 
celebrated through religious myths. Its thesis and recommendation is therefore 
that the philosophical discipline of metaphysics can be legitimately and 
fruitfully used to help understand myths. 
 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the assertion that religions typically 
include metaphysics, and that religions typically express their metaphysical 
views in their myths, had a certain following. The historians Henri 
and H. A. Frankfort, for example, approached ancient Near Eastern narratives 
without separating the expressive function of the stories from their 
cognitive function.1 Although they admit that the speculative thought that 
one might find in myths lacks “detachment”, they argue that “[m]yth is a 
form of poetry [that] . . . proclaims a truth”; myths provide “a poetic form 
of truth”.2 According to the Frankforts, the images that one finds in myths 
– the representations of cosmic forces as bulls or hawks, gods or heroes – 
provide the terms with which a culture reflects upon its experience of the 
world. These reflections concern not only the forces of nature, say, storms 
or death, but also the abstract categories of causality, space, and time. Mythic 
thought about what exists is inseparable from images; it is thought through the 
images. “Myth, then, is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a significant, 
if unverifiable truth – we might say a metaphysical truth.”3 
 
Similarly, Mircea Eliade argues that myth includes an acritical but nevertheless 
intelligible form of philosophy. As he says, “Obviously, the metaphysical 
concepts of the archaic world were not always formulated in theoretical 
language; but the symbol, the myth, the rite, express, on different planes and 
through the means proper to them, a complex system of coherent affirmations 
about the ultimate reality of things, a system that can be regarded as 
constituting a metaphysics.”4 Myths do not use the language of “being”, 
“becoming”, or “nonbeing”, but according to Eliade, when myths describe 
how different features of reality were created in illud tempus, they describe 
not alleged prehistorical events but rather the archetypes that constitute 
a human world view. In this way, mythic language puts into memorable 
narrative the structures of “the human condition as such”.5 
 
Perhaps the most reticulate account of the relation of myth to metaphysics 
is that of Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz, the very definition of religion 
is that it weds an ethos to a world view, an axiology to a metaphysics. 
The metaphysical aspect of a religion “objectivizes moral and aesthetic 
preferences by depicting them as the imposed conditions of life implicit in a 
world with a particular structure, as mere common sense given the unalterable 
shape of reality.”6 Myths play a crucial part in this wedding. As Geertz says, 
“meanings can only be ‘stored’ in symbols: a cross, a crescent, or a feathered 
serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatized in rituals or related in myths, 
are felt somehow to sum up, for those for whom they are resonant, what is 
known about the way the world is, the quality of emotional life it supports, 
and the way one ought to behave while in it”.7 Geertz goes so far as to say 
that metaphysics is an essential element in all religions; metaphysics is thus 
a part of his very definition of religion.8 This is, in my opinion, a good definition 
of religion, one whose fruitfulness has not been fully taken advantage 
of. Nevertheless, my proposal in this paper is not that myths necessarily or 
essentially include metaphysics, but only that they may include metaphysical 
insights and that insofar as they do, interpreters of myths need to be open to 
the possibility of reading myths in this way. 
 
Explicitly metaphysical interpretations like the three above can generate 
fertile hypotheses for the study of myths. These include important philosophical 
questions, such as: to what extent can speculative thought be put 
into narrative form? And, what are the differences between the understandings 
of reality as such in one culture and those in another? Attention to 
the metaphysics in myths also points to (and certainly does not hinder one 
from asking) important sociological questions, such as: are the metaphysical 
myths used to justify particular social arrangements? And, does the interest in 
metaphysical myths correspond to different sections of society, or to different 
types of society? 
 
But although the above writers appeal to the idea that religious myths 
explicitly or implicitly make metaphysical claims, they do not develop the 
idea from a philosophical point of view. They do not articulate what it means 
for a world view to be a metaphysical world view, nor how one might speak 
of it as true or false. Any philosophical proposal in which one asserts that 
interpreters should attend to metaphysics when seeking to understand myths 
must have an understanding of metaphysics that is credible. This is not 
easy. It is, in my opinion, the general consensus among philosophers in the 
West since Kant that metaphysics in the sense of inquiry into the character 
of reality as such is no longer legitimate, either because statements about 
reality as such are unintelligible or because although they are intelligible, 
such statements can never be validated and thus metaphysical knowledge 
is impossible. Despite their significant differences, this consensus is shared 
by most Kantians, phenomenologists, critical theorists, analytic philosophers, 
neopragmatists, and deconstructionists. As a friend told me, seeking to defend 
metaphysics in a postmodern context when rationality itself is in question is 
like rearranging the chairs on a sinking ship. His own preferred approach to 
religious narratives is to read myths as an evocative but noncognitive form of 
fiction, and his approach is not atypical. There is little attention paid to the 
cognitive dimension of myths. Perhaps this is the reason that, over the last 
quarter of a century, the practice of reading myths as explicitly or implicitly 
making metaphysical claims has fallen out of favor. It is the aim of the paper 
to recommend a return to this approach. 
 
The metaphysical interpretation of myths 
 
What is meant by saying that a given myth is “metaphysical”? What is a 
metaphysical interpretation of myths? In a nutshell, this approach says, first, 
that myths function to provide models and, second, that some of these models 
are all-inclusive in scope. 
 
In saying that myths provide models, one says that they provide metaphoric 
images through which one comes to understand diverse aspects of 
the world. This idea is found famously in Geertz, who argues that myths 
function simultaneously as models of reality (insofar as they represent the 
structure of what is) and models for reality (insofar as they recommend the 
structure of what ought to be).9 So far as I know, however, the most helpful 
discussion of this idea of myths as religious models is that of Ian Barbour.10 
Barbour argues that the religious models found in myths function as interpretative 
frameworks, drawing one’s attention to certain patterns among one’s 
experiences and connecting them to each other in distinctive ways. The types 
of experience that religious models are typically employed to interpret are 
experiences of awe and reverence, of mystical union, of moral obligation, of 
reorientation and reconciliation, of interpersonal experiences, of key historical 
events, and of order and creativity in the world. In all of these cases, 
models involve a process that Barbour calls “interpreting as”. In the light of a 
myth, for example, an experience of death is interpreted as a punishment. On 
this account, the religious person does not experience facts that the nonreligious 
person does not; rather, in the light of myths she interprets the fact 
differently, namely, as a revelation or manifestation of the sacred that has a 
certain character. 
 
Some models may be of relatively local interpretive power: they tell their 
audience, for example, to interpret storms as hostile or to interpret the ruler 
as a manifestation of the divine. Others may provide patterns of a larger 
scale. Bultmann thought that religious myths symbolically referred to human 
existence as a whole; Eliade believed the same. To interpret a myth as metaphysical, 
however, is to say that the scope of the model is intended to include 
all reality. That is, to follow Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics, a metaphysical 
myth describes the character that anything has insofar as it exists as 
anything at all. It seeks to describe what exists not insofar as each thing is a 
particular thing it is, but rather insofar as it is anything at all. Metaphysical 
assertions can therefore be put into the form “All concrete realities are X”, 
where X might mean “ensouled”, or “created by God”, or “formed by karmic 
energy”. In short, then, to interpret a myth metaphysically is to say that the 
myth provides a cognitive framework for understanding reality as such. 
 
One should note that this understanding of metaphysics does not necessarily 
involve reference to the supernatural. When metaphysics is understood 
in the pre-Kantian sense of inquiry into supernatural, extra-experiential realities, 
then some religions seem to include metaphysics but others do not. The 
Analects of Confucius and the Majjhima Nikaya of the Buddha, for example, 
are famous for being uninterested in this sense of metaphysics. The pre- 
Kantian understanding of metaphysics is therefore not an appropriate tool for 
the study of all religions, for some religions are, so to speak, too pragmatic 
or this-worldly. Another limitation of that understanding of metaphysics is 
that it seems only appropriate for the study of those religious traditions 
which include a class of intellectuals (usually leisured and elite) that has 
an interest in pursuing such theories. On the understanding of metaphysics 
I intend, however, metaphysics concerns not supernatural entities but, rather, 
the general character of reality which may or may not include supranatural 
entities. In short, insofar as a religion includes an understanding that reality 
has some general character which one should take into account, it has a 
metaphysics. 
 
People sometimes say that myths cannot include metaphysics because 
ancient or “primitive” people lacked an interest in or a capacity for pursuing 
knowledge for its own sake, as distinct from practical knowledge that serves 
human needs. There is a legitimate distinction to be had between knowledge 
“in itself” and knowledge “for us” and all religious communities are 
overwhelmingly interested in the latter, but the distinction should not be 
overdrawn or else we will not be able to make sense of the presence of 
metaphysics in any religion. It is true: religions typically show little interest 
in metaphysical knowledge for its own sake. But they typically do show 
an interest in the idea of metaphysical knowledge pursued as part of transforming 
one’s perceptions, affects, and character in order to be in accord with 
the true nature of things.11 
 
The metaphysics one finds in myth is typically in service of this transformation. 
For example, myths often describe behavior that is presented as an 
admirable ideal to be emulated or a cautionary example to be avoided. When 
the behavior is identified as admirable and worthy of imitation because it is 
in accord with the way things are, or to be avoided because it is not in such 
accord, then such a text has a metaphysical dimension. Recall those stories 
whose point is that, despite appearances of wealth or beauty or status, there 
are more ultimate forces at work (karma, the divine will or plan, the Tao, the 
mandate of heaven). If these forces are not contingent but aspects of reality 
as such, then an ethos is being married to metaphysics. The metaphysical 
dimension of creation myths operates in the same transformative way.12 That 
is, myths of creation may describe outright the principles or forces of reality 
as such, and the performative, ritual context of the myth typically makes 
clear that the metaphysical knowledge is not presented as solely the answer 
to an intellectualist question about what exists but rather serves as saving or 
liberating knowledge with which one can properly orient oneself in the world. 
 
 
Whether the metaphysics in myths can possibly be true 
 
There may be some who have read to this point who agree with the interpretive 
claim that at least some myths provide models of the world that are 
designed to orient one to the character of reality as such, but who would not 
wish to raise the normative issue whether such metaphysical claims might be 
true. These are in fact two distinct questions, and I agree with Malinowski 
that, ultimately, the question whether myths are true or false, whether they 
successfully reflect the divine, “is a problem of theology or metaphysics” 
rather than the social sciences: “the anthropologist has done enough when 
he has shown the value of a phenomenon for social integrity and for the 
continuity of culture.”13 
 
Nevertheless, if the Frankforts, Eliade, Geertz, and I are right that at least 
some myths metaphysical claims, then whether or not metaphysical claims 
can be true becomes an issue not only for philosophers. All those who study 
myths – all interpreters – approach their texts with a set of assumptions, and 
some of these assumptions are philosophical. One of the most basic philosophical 
assumptions that interpreters bring to the study of myths is whether 
or not to read them in the cognitive sense as cognitively meaningful or meaningless, 
that is, as making claims that might possibly be true or false or as 
not making such claims. If one works with the assumption that myths make 
or imply metaphysical claims that might possibly be true, then one needs 
at least some implicit understanding of how they might be true, i.e., one’s 
interpretation requires some criterion of metaphysical truth.14 The interpreter 
need not take the further step of assessing whether the religious metaphysics 
are in fact true or false (and anthropologists, historians, psychologists, and 
sociologists of religion may properly choose not to pursue this question) but 
if one interprets myths as “in some sense true” or “possibly true” then one 
must have some understanding of how this is so. 
 
To the question whether the metaphysics in myths can be true, of course, 
many interpreters assert or assume that the answer is no. Some hold that since 
metaphysical claims cannot be verified or falsified through sense experience, 
they are by definition not cognitive, neither true not false, and therefore metaphysics 
cannot be distinguished from poetry. This was the view of the logical 
positivists, and though few in Religious Studies would describe themselves 
as members of that discredited movement, the view is still clearly assumed 
by some who write about myths. It is because they consider the metaphysical 
claims made by myths to be cognitively empty hat they interpret myths as 
merely ideology or priestcraft; that is, they seek some sociological or psychological 
explanation of why people would tell tales that cannot be possibly 
true or false. Other interpreters answer that metaphysical claims are conceivably 
true or false, but they can never be known to be true or false. This not 
unpopular view is held, for example, by Joseph Campbell,15 Alan Watts,16 
and Eliseo Vivas,17 and each of its versions can be traced back to Kant’s claim 
that beyond all conceivable human experience there are noumenal realities 
that can be thought, even though they cannot ever be known. Below I will 
argue the Kant’s idea of noumena is not tenable; therefore the positivist claim 
that metaphysical claims are unverifiable and the Kantian claim that they 
cannot be known to be true are equivalent. But for now it is enough to see 
that both the positivist and the Kantian approaches to myths reflect a criterion 
by which the interpreter understands how claims are true, but for both it is a 
criterion which excludes the possibility of a true metaphysical claim. To show 
that there is a credible alternative to it is the point of the rest of this section. 
 
For reasons of space, I won’t be able to give a full-blooded defense of the 
possibility of metaphysics.18 But I think that I can say at least the following. 
The metaphysician can agree with Kant that knowledge of things as they 
are in themselves, knowledge of things that cannot be experienced, is not 
available. Kant is right that any metaphysics that seeks to describe what he 
calls noumena is not credible. In fact, the metaphysician can go further than 
Kant, and argue (with Hegel and Nietzsche and Dewey) that the category 
of noumena is itself unintelligible. The idea of “realities” which are alleged 
to be conceivable but cannot conceivably be experienced is an incoherent 
one. Metaphysicians can and should abandon it, and think of the scope of 
intelligible statements as “limited” to what can conceivably be experienced.19 
 
Given this “limitation” of philosophy to what can conceivably be experienced, 
however, I believe that some interpretations of rational inquiry into 
the character of reality as such remain tenable. The definition of metaphysics 
that follows is taken from the works of Charles Hartshorne.20 
 
The key distinction that needs to be made in order to appreciate this understanding 
of metaphysics is between two kinds of existential claims about what 
there is. There are, according to Hartshorne, two kinds of existential claims: 
some claims about what exists are restrictive in the sense that they purport 
to be true only under some conditions; other claims about what exists are 
nonrestrictive in the sense that they purport to be true under all conditions. 
The truth of a given claim belonging to the first class of claims is contingent 
in that the claim could be false. This is because it designates a particular state 
of affairs that might or might not obtain. This class is relatively unproblematic 
and includes historical claims, scientific claims, and the overwhelming 
majority of statements about what exists. “It is raining at a given place and 
time” is an example. The truth of a claim belonging to the second class of 
existential claims would be necessary in that, if true, it could not possibly 
be false. This is because such claims do not designate a particular state of 
affairs but rather, designate the generic features of all possible states of affairs. 
Examples include “every possible existent is a substance”, “every possible 
existent is an event”, “every possible existent is a product of consciousness”, 
“every possible existent is composed of matter” and so on. On this definition 
of metaphysics, metaphysical claims seek to describe absolutely all things, 
or in other words they purport to be true under all conditions. Such claims 
allege to be necessary and therefore, if they are true, they cannot conceivably 
be falsified. Because they cannot conceivably be falsified, metaphysics 
cannot be understood as an empirical inquiry that compares hypotheses to 
states of affairs. Rather, metaphysics is a form of logical inquiry that argues 
that some understanding of the nature of reality is logically necessary as the 
condition for the possibility of the existence of anything whatsoever. Metaphysical 
claims for the possibility of the existence of anything whatsoever. 
Metaphysical claims purport to be about what is always and everywhere the 
case. Or to repeat, they concern the character of reality under all conditions. 
 
This definition of metaphysics avoids many of the criticisms of metaphysics 
prevalent in contemporary philosophy. Metaphysical claims on this 
account assume no “God’s eye view,” no “view from nowhere,” no privileged 
access or intuition into reality; they are not an attempt to pierce the “veil of 
ideas.” They reject the scientistic claim that all knowledge is empirical, but 
they do not violate pragmatic or phenomenological criteria of meaning. For 
this reason, I prefer to describe metaphysics using Aristotle’s formulation of 
metaphysics an inquiry into the character of reality as such, rather than Kant’s 
formulation of metaphysics as inquiry into the character of reality “in itself.” 
On this account, metaphysics abandons the idea of reality “in itself” and is 
not saddled with explaining how one can know the world as it is apart from 
the categories of human understanding. 
 
From Hartshorne one can draw a criterion for metaphysical truth in myths: 
the metaphysics is true to the extent that it represents the general character 
of what is, so that it cannot conceivably be falsified.21 From this criterion 
it follows that one might invalidate a metaphysical claim that is alleged to 
be true in two ways. One might show that it does not hold in every case, 
that there are exceptions to it, in which case one shows that is a contingent 
claim rather than a properly metaphysical claim. Or one might argue that what 
it claims to be the case, when one considers its implications, is incoherent, 
that it is a self-contradictory claim. Positively put, one can seek to validate 
a metaphysical model by interpreting more and more areas of experience in 
terms of it, thereby showing its adequacy to experience. Or one can seek to 
show that the metaphysical claim, along with its implications, is coherent and 
that it is the denial of the claim that is self-contradictory. 
 
 
An illustrative example 
 
Of course, to say that a given myth makes or implies metaphysical claims 
is not to exhaust the meaning of the myth. A single myth can operate with 
several levels of reference, each having to do with different aspects of reality. 
William Doty distinguishes four such levels: the psychological, the sociological, 
the cosmological, and the metaphysical.22 On Doty’s analysis, the 
psychological level of reference found in myths provides a paradigm for life 
stages and roles; the sociological level addresses social divisions of labor, 
gender, and power; the cosmological renders an image of the universe; and the 
metaphysical level maps the differences of being, non-being, and becoming. 
 
All four of these levels are important to understand what a given myth 
means. The cosmological and metaphysical aspects of myths, however, 
receive less attention and are often confused with each other, often under 
the catch-all label “world view”. According to the definition of metaphysics 
I introduced above, cosmological models in a myth are empirical rather than 
metaphysical.23 They have to do with character of this particular world, 
whereas properly metaphysical references have to do with the character of 
any possible world. Another way to put this is to say that cosmological 
features of the world might be otherwise – there might have been or might 
yet be changes to the cosmological character of the world in some previous 
or future cosmic epoch – but metaphysical features of the world are necessary 
and not conceivably otherwise. The metaphysical interpretation of myths 
focuses on a myth’s reference to the ineliminable aspects of reality. 
 
Here is an illustration of how attention to metaphysics can add to our 
understanding of a myth. Consider the Buddhist story of the cyclical evolution 
of the world as told in the Aggañña Sutta.24 Although not a myth of 
“creation,” since in Buddhism that which is has no ultimate beginning, it is 
an account of the emergence of the present world. It begins, 
 
 
O monks, eventually there comes a time when, after a long period, this 
world starts to wind down. And as the world is winding down, beings 
for the most part are reborn out of it, in the Realm of the Radiant Gods. 
Eventually, after another long period, it happens that this world that has 
ended begins to reevolve. And as it is reevolving, settling, and becoming 
established, certain beings, in order to work out their karma, fall from 
the Realm of the Radian Gods and come to be once again in this world. 
These beings by nature are self-luminescent and move through the air. 
They are made of mind, feed on joy, dwell in bliss, and go where they 
will. 
 
 
As the Earth begins to settle and solidify, one of the luminous deities, “fickle 
and greedy by nature”, eats of it. Others imitate him, and as they eat, they 
too become more solid and take on shapes. The beings begin to be able to 
perceive differences amongst themselves; some are attractive, others less so, 
and this leads to pride and arrogance. The more they eat, the more substantial 
they become, until sexes emerge, which leads to carnal thoughts and illicit 
behavior. The foodstuff they eat also becomes more and more “earthy”, until 
it appears as a rice which is wonderful but must be harvested. Gathering 
and storing rice, though, leads the lazy to thievery; this then leads to lying 
about one’s guilt and to violence. In this deteriorating state, the beings decide 
that they need to elect a king to maintain peace and administer justice. The 
story ends with the installation of the Great Elected One. By the end of the 
discourse, the world which had “wound down” at the outset has reconstituted 
itself into the familiar world of conflict, anxiety, and suffering called samsara. 
 
How ought such a story be interpreted? Clearly, at least some of the four 
levels Doty describes are present. Though the myth does not deal with a hero 
or savior who might symbolize a mature, healthy psyche, a psychological 
interpretation might still read the myth as describing the stages of ego development, 
including therein the emergence of desire, self-image, and sexuality. 
A sociological interpretation might focus on the social contract theory and 
the ways in which this story could justify the status of kings even while 
showing that kingship is not inevitable or natural but rather a socially created 
institution invented for the sake of the needs of the ruled. A cosmological 
interpretation could focus on the different realms that exist and the different 
kinds of beings that emerge.25 
 
Does the myth also include metaphysics? At the heart of the story is a 
continuous cyclical process of evolving and de-evolving. The story makes 
it clear that this process concerns not just the emergence of human life but 
rather it is that process through which the world itself emerges. Nor is it 
solely a cosmological process (like, say, the development of a star) that is 
independent of humanity. The evolution of the world is wedded to human 
desires and actions. Seeing this, one might interpret the story, not as an 
account of creation that is alternative to the Buddhist doctrine of interdependent 
origination (pratityasamutpada), but rather as a narrative illustration 
of that doctrine. This doctrine, in its classical formula, says that “When this 
exists, that exists or comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When 
this does not exist, that does not exist or come to be; on the cessation of this, 
that ceases. That is to say: on ignorance depend dispositions; on dispositions 
depends consciousness; on consciousness depend name and form; on name 
and form depend the six gateways; on the six gateways depends contact; on 
contact depends craving; on craving depends grasping; on grasping depends 
becoming; on becoming depends birth; on birth depend old age and death. 
In this manner there arises the mass of suffering [samsara].”26 The myth 
takes this teaching that there is nothing that does not have an origin, and 
that nothing originates of its own power, and dramatizes it. 
 
Is the doctrine of interdependent origination a metaphysical teaching? The 
answer depends on one’s definition of metaphysics. In this paper, metaphysics 
describes the character that anything has insofar as it is anything at all. Interdependent 
origination seems to fit this description since, in this myth at least, 
the process of interdependent origination is not limited to human psyches, 
nor to society, nor even to the physical cosmos. As a nonrestrictive aspect of 
reality as such, it is present in and through all of these and without it none 
of them would exist at all. It can be distinguished from cosmology insofar 
as interdependent origination is allegedly true a priori whereas cosmological 
truths would be empirical and hence allegedly true a posteriori. For example, 
that there is an Earth in the cosmos is an empirical claim; that whatever 
exists in the cosmos originated interdependently is on this interpretation a 
metaphysical claim; if true, it is true whatever there is. 
 
Let’s turn to this question of truth. To repeat what was expressed above, 
an interpreter need not pursue the question whether or not a myth is true. 
But if an interpreter wants to say that the myth’s depiction of reality as 
such is neither unitelligible nonsense nor absolutely unknowable – in other 
words, if the interpreter wants an understanding of how such claims might 
be held as true claims by those who believe them – then the question of how 
metaphysical claims might be validated remains relevant. 
 
If one wanted to argue that the cosmology in the myth (in the sense of 
the empirical explanation of the universe) is true, then one would seek to 
show that that explanation accounts for the relevant data better than other 
explanations do. Despite the element of speculation here, this is in essence a 
scientific question to be settled by physicists. If one wanted to argue that the 
metaphysics in the myth is true, however, then one would have to show not 
only that the metaphysical claims meet empirical criteria, in the sense that 
there are at least some realities to which they apply. One must also show that 
the metaphysical claims meet logical criteria, in the sense that there is nothing 
incoherent in the idea that everything arises interdependently, in the idea that 
nothing exists independently. One might argue for this view by showing that 
there is something incoherent in the idea of an entity that exists of its own 
accord. Conversely, if one wanted to argue that the metaphysics in the myth 
is not true, then one would argue that there is something incoherent in this 
view. Or one might argue against this view by showing that there must be an 
entity that exists of its own accord.27 
 
From this example one can see how myths can be read as providing 
models of reality as such. In fact, I think that one can see how interpreters 
of such narratives can develop from such myths an explicit, non-narrative 
metaphysics. This is true whether the interpreter is a member of the religious 
tradition that recounts the myth or not. The interpretive task of a Thomas 
Aquinas or a Sankara does not seem different from that of a contemporary 
academic in this respect, for as I argued in section I, metaphysical issues arise 
not only for the philosopher interested in assessing truth claims, but also for 
anyone who simply seeks to understand the myth. 
 
 
The contribution of the metaphysical interpretation of myths 
 
I hope that it is clear that my recommendation is not that myths be interpreted 
as metaphysical rather than, say, social or psychological or psychological 
or cosmological, but that the metaphysical interpretation be added to the 
methodological tool kit used by interpreters of myth. This would mean that 
those who find that a metaphysical approach illuminates myths could use it 
and those who do not use it would not exclude it as illegitimate. 
 
To add a metaphysical interpretation to those already being used to interpret 
myths could make a difference both to the study of myths and to 
philosophy of religion. Insofar as myths involve metaphysics, any study of 
myth that excludes metaphysics distorts and truncates its object. Clearly, to 
assume that myths cannot involve metaphysics blinds one to the possibility 
that a myth attempts to describe a culture’s understanding of reality as such. 
This blindness in turn blinkers one to other aspects of myths. For example, 
the metaphysical claims in myths often play a justificatory function in the 
religion. That is, they often serve to legitimate what the religion considers 
proper attitudes, practices, and beliefs. They assert or imply that one should 
conduct oneself in a specified way, because such is the appropriate conduct, 
given the nature of things. Geertz sees this point clearly when he says that a 
religious ethos is typically grounded on a religious metaphysics. As he put it, 
 
The source of [a religion’s] moral vitality is conceived to lie in the 
fidelity with which is expresses the fundamental nature of reality. The 
powerfully coercive “ought” is felt to grow out of a comprehensive 
factual “is,” and in such a way religion grounds the most specific requirements 
of human action in the most general contexts of human existence. 
. . . The need for such a metaphysical grounding for values seems to vary 
quite widely in intensity from culture to culture and from individual 
to individual, but the tendency to desire some sort of factual basis for 
one’s commitments seems practically universal; mere conventionalism 
satisfies few people in any culture.28 
 
Reading myths with an attention to metaphysics therefore helps one to take 
into account the justificatory function of myths: that myths claim to justify 
a way of life by describing the way the world really is. If one ignores this 
cognitive dimension, one has a truncated understanding of myths as merely 
ideology or as just literature. Attention to metaphysics helps to avoid this. 
 
The metaphysical interpretation of myths could also contribute to philosophy 
of religion, and in particular to the philosophical study of religious 
metaphysics. In this capacity, it complements the approach to philosophy 
that has been called “ethnometaphysics.”29 Ethnometaphysics proposes as a 
working hypothesis the idea that different cultures have different metaphysical 
views and so a legitimate part of the study of a culture is the study of 
its cognitive orientation to reality as such. It proceeds under the assumption 
that understandings of the necessary features of reality are not exclusive to 
the Western philosophical tradition, or even of the so-called “high cultures.” 
Douglas Rabb and Dennis McPherson have recently sought to articulate 
the program of ethnometaphysics in a way that does not incur relativism. 
They argue that philosophers should adopt what they call the “polycentric 
perspective” that says that all cultures embody particular conceptions of 
reality which can be accorded validity without assuming reducibility to or 
commensurability with others.30 They hold that this perspective undermines 
the “save-the-savages” view that assumes that the exclusively true meta- 
physics has already been identified, either in scientific materialism or in 
Christian theistic metaphysics, and that when we do discover rival metaphysical 
systems we should try to free their adherents from those beliefs. Neither 
of those views permits the scholar to take seriously the idea that ethnometaphysical 
systems might have truth. I think that my proposal of a metaphysical 
interpretation of myths dovetails with this proposal (though I think that the 
goals of ethnometaphysics might best be served if it dropped the prefix). 
 
The discipline of philosophy of religion has become mired in the study 
of religious beliefs abstracted from their cultural context (what Paul Griffiths 
has called “denaturalized discourse”31) to the detriment of other philosophical 
forms of religious discourse. The study of religious metaphysics also 
has a too narrow view of what the possibilities are. What is needed is an 
appreciation of the extent to which speculation on the nature of things is a 
global phenomenon and of the variety of forms that such speculation takes. 
What is needed is an understanding of philosophy of religion as an openended 
inquiry that works in conversation with anthropologists and historians 
of religion. It is my hope that this essay might contribute in a small way to 
develop philosophy of religion in that direction.32 
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